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Abstract We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property)
over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the
government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also
a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically
fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy
the budget constraint.
1 Introduction
Restitution is a form of delivering justice to people that have been dispossessed of their land or property. We
study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (object) over which two agents have
rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the
situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. The government faces a budget constraint,
i.e., there is a maximum amount of money that the government is willing to give as a compensation.
A rule determines, for each problem, who gets the object and the level of compensation for the other
agent. Note that an agent cannot receive the object and a compensation at the same time. Moreover, a negative
compensation is not allowed. Our objective is to identify rules that are well-behaved from normative and
strategic viewpoints. We assess the desirability of a rule from different perspectives: fairness, incentives,
and whether it satisfies the budget constraint.
Our study is inspired by the discussion of reparation for victims of the internal conflict and land
restitution in Colombia. The conflict between the government, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), and paramilitaries displaced many people from their lands in the last decades. It is estimated that
there are between 3.6 and 5.2 million displaced people in Colombia. In June 2011, the Colombian government
introduced a bill on land restitution stipulating that the dispossessed agent gets the land and the owner
receives exactly the maximum compensation.1 However, only approximately 10% of the displaced people
are willing to return to their original residency (Iba´n˜ez, 2009).
Colombia is not the only country with restitution problems. After the reunification of Germany in
1990, there were 1.2 million (separate) claims for the restitution of land or property expropriated by either
the Third Reich or the government of former East Germany (Blacksell and Born, 2002). When a claim
for restitution was endorsed, the applicant had to decide whether he wanted restitution or compensation
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1 In Colombia, the maximum compensation is defined as the “market value” of the land. In other instances, the market
value of the object may not be known and the maximum compensation is determined in a different way.
(Southern, 1993). Many countries in Central and Eastern Europe also adopted policies for the restitution
of land or property that had been confiscated during the Communist era. In Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia,
the restitution consisted of the delivery of the actual property. Hungary instituted vouchers, which were
issued in lieu of cash payments, that could be used to buy shares in privatized companies, to pay for state-
owned housing or to buy land at state land auctions. In Lithuania, the restitution law specified the right to
receive land or compensation (Grover and Bo´rquez, 2004). Another example is South Africa, where after
the abolition of apartheid, there was a land restitution program in which land was returned or claimants
were compensated financially (Barry, 2011). The confiscated land during the Cuban revolution and the
divided island of Cyprus will most likely lead to similar restitution problems in the future.
1.1 Overview of Properties
According to the United Nations, reparative measures should be fair, just, proportionate to the gravity of the
violation and the resulting damage, and should include restitution and compensation amongst others (van
Boven, 2010). In the literature of fair allocation, a basic requirement is envy-freeness, i.e., no agent should
prefer the other agent’s consumption to his own (Foley, 1967). In a restitution problem, the dispossessed
agent is perceived as the victim and thus should receive a more favorable treatment. Therefore, we propose
an asymmetric version of envy-freeness that only applies to the dispossessed agent, dispossessed envy-freeness,
i.e., the dispossessed agent should not prefer the owner’s consumption to his own.
Strategic considerations lead to the next axiom. We may not know agent’s valuation of the object. If
we ask the agent for his valuation, he may behave strategically. Hence, we require strategy-proofness, i.e.,
no agent benefits from misrepresenting his valuation. We focus also on possible joint manipulations by
the dispossessed agent and the owner, and study pair strategy-proofness, i.e., no joint misrepresentation of
valuations should make both agents at least as well off, and at least one of them better off. We also consider
a weaker version of pair strategy-proofness called weak pair strategy-proofness, i.e., no joint misrepresentation
of valuations should make both agents better off.
Since the monetary compensation is provided by the government, there is a budget constraint. The
government can give at most the maximum compensation to the agent who does not receive the object. We
also would like to guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents. We define two properties because of the
asymmetry of agents in the restitution problem. The first property is dispossessed welfare lower bound, i.e.,
the consumption of the dispossessed agent should be at least as desirable as the object. The second one is
owner welfare lower bound, i.e., the consumption of the owner should be at least as desirable as the object
or the maximum compensation.
Finally, we are interested in rules for which small changes in the data of the problem do not cause
large changes in the chosen allocation in terms of the welfare of the dispossessed agent or the allocation
of the object. For this reason, we use two weak “continuity” properties. These slightly technical properties
precisely determine who receives the object when both agents have the same valuation.
1.2 Overview of Results
Our main result is a characterization of the family of rules that satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-
proofness, and two continuity properties (Theorem 1). The rules in the family are parametrized by a “thresh-
old function” τ and a “monetary compensation function” m. We call these rules the τ -m family. The thresh-
old function τ is a function of the valuation of the owner. The dispossessed agent receives the object if
and only if his valuation weakly surpasses the threshold. In addition, the threshold function determines the
compensation for the dispossessed agent when he does not get the object. The compensation function m is
a function of the valuation of the dispossessed agent, and determines the compensation for the owner when
he does not get the object.
Next, we consider the budget constraint and identify the subfamily of the τ -m family that also satisfies
government budget constraint (Theorem 2). Moreover, we incorporate welfare lower bounds and identify the
subfamily of the τ -m family that also satisfies owner welfare lower bound (Theorem 3)— all our rules in the
τ -m family satisfy dispossessed welfare lower bound (Remark 3). Finally, we characterize the subfamily of
the τ -m family that satisfies both properties, government budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound
(Theorem 4).
The Colombian government’s rule does not satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness. In the family of the rules
that we characterize, there are “simple” rules that are easy to put in practice and satisfy dispossessed
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envy-freeness and government budget constraint. As an example, consider the rule that gives the land to the
dispossessed agent if and only if his valuation is at least the maximum compensation. The agent who does
not get the land receives the maximum compensation. This rule belongs to all the families we characterize
in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4.
1.3 Related Literature
The closest model to ours is the allocation of indivisible goods where (both positive and negative) monetary
transfers are possible. In this model, strategy-proof rules are characterized (Nisan, 2007, Ch. 9). Each of
these rules specifies a threshold function for each agent that depends only on the other agents’ valuations. If
an agent’s valuation is below the threshold, he does not get any object and receives a monetary transfer that
depends only on the other agents’ valuations. If his valuation is above the threshold, he receives an object
and receives a monetary transfer that depends only on the other agents’ valuations and the threshold. This
result generalizes the characterization of the rules that are strategy-proof and object efficient, i.e., objects
are always allocated to agents with the highest valuations (Holmstro¨m, 1979).2
In the allocation of indivisible goods together with some amount of money where the goods are always
allocated, envy-freeness implies object efficiency (Svensson, 1983). A rule is budget balanced if the sum of the
monetary transfers is equal to the amount of money available. Here, envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and
budget balancedness are not compatible (Alkan et al, 1991; Tadenuma and Thomson, 1995). However, this
incompatibility does not hold in the domain where the monetary transfers cannot exceed some exogenously
given upper bound for each good (Sun and Yang, 2003; Andersson and Svensson, 2008a; Svensson, 2009).
For instance, the “optimal fair rules” are envy-free and strategy-proof (Sun and Yang, 2003).3 Moreover,
they are characterized by envy-freeness, a regularity condition, and group strategy-proofness, i.e., no group
of agents benefits from misrepresenting their valuations (Andersson and Svensson, 2008a; Svensson, 2009).
When there are copies of one indivisible good and the sum of the monetary transfers can be at most the
amount of money available, envy-free and strategy-proof rules are characterized (Ohseto, 2006).4
In the domain where monetary transfers have to be between a lower bound and an upper bound for
each good, envy-freeness and strategy-proofness are incompatible (Andersson and Svensson, 2008b; Andersson
et al, 2010). Andersson et al (2010) consider a problem in which the monetary transfer for an agent who
does not receive an object is fixed. They define a weaker version of envy-freeness that only applies to the
agents that do receive a good, constrained envy-freeness, i.e., an agent receiving an object should not envy an
agent who does not receive an object. They show that there are rules satisfying constrained envy-freeness but
not strategy-proofness. Andersson and Svensson (2008b) consider a problem in which there are copies of one
indivisible good and introduce weak envy-freeness. A rule is weakly envy-free if it satisfies three conditions:
(i) the rule respects priorities, i.e., given a priority order among the agents, no agent envies some other
agent with a lower priority; (ii) it is object efficient ; and (iii) no agent envies any agent that receives a
positive monetary transfer. They characterize weakly envy-free and group strategy-proof rules that satisfy
some regularity conditions.
In our model, we consider one indivisible good, lower bounds on the monetary transfers (equal to zero),
and an upper bound on the monetary transfer for the agent who receives the object (equal to zero). In
Proposition 1, we characterize the envy-free and strategy-proof rules. These rules are closely related to the
ones characterized by Ohseto (2006) and Svensson (2009). The main difference is that we do not consider
an upper bound on the monetary transfer for the agent who does not receive the object. When this upper
bound is introduced (government budget constraint), envy-freeness and strategy-proofness are incompatible.
The τ -m family is a subfamily of the rules characterized by Nisan (2007). Therefore, as in Nisan (2007),
there is a threshold function that depends on the valuation of the owner and determines whether the
dispossessed agent receives the object. If the object is assigned to the owner, then the compensation for
the dispossessed agent depends on the valuation of the owner and the threshold function. If the object is
assigned to the dispossessed agent, then the monetary compensation for the owner depends on the valuation
of the dispossessed agent and the monetary compensation function (which in turn depends on the threshold
2 Holmstro¨m (1979) shows that the strategy-proof and object efficient rules are Groves rules (Vickrey, 1961; Clark, 1971;
Groves, 1973). Strategy-proofness and object efficiency imply transfers that need not sum to zero, i.e., an incompatibility
with balancedness (Green and Laffont, 1977).
3 The “optimal fair rules” are not the only rules that are envy-free and strategy-proof. For an example, see Svensson
(2009).
4 Andersson et al (2012), on the other hand, do not consider envy-freeness but instead focus on “competitive” and
budget-balanced allocation rules satisfying a weaker version of strategy-proofness.
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function). However, the τ -m family is different from the family of weakly envy-free and group strategy-proof
rules in Andersson and Svensson (2008b). First, dispossessed envy-freeness is weaker than weak envy-freeness.
In our model, respecting priorities is equivalent to dispossessed envy-freeness only when the dispossessed agent
would have a higher priority (but we do not make this assumption). Moreover, dispossessed envy-freeness
does not imply object efficiency, unlike weak envy-freeness. Second, strategy-proofness is weaker than group
strategy-proofness. Our paper introduces a family of strategy-proof and asymmetrically fair rules that is not
necessarily object efficient.
In the models above, including ours, the object is always allocated. Athanasiou (2013) and Sprumont
(2013) focus on a model in which an object might remain unallocated. They study rules that are, among
other properties, strategy-proof and anonymous, i.e., the rule does not depend on the name of the agents.
Strategy-proofness and anonymity imply that whenever the object is allocated, it is assigned to an agent
with the highest valuation. Our rules do not satisfy this property. In some problems, the agent with the
lowest valuation receives the object.
Finally, there are also two papers about land acquisition with many sellers and one buyer that focus
on Bayesian incentive compatibility (Mishra et al, 2008; Kominers and Weyl, 2011). Kominers and Weyl
(2011) propose “concordance mechanisms” that are “approximately individually rational,” ensure incentive
compatibility, and converge to efficiency as the number of sellers tends to infinite. Mishra et al (2008)
characterize incentive compatible mechanisms that satisfy exactly two of the properties among individual
rationality, budget balancedness, and efficiency.
In Section 2, we introduce the model and some properties of rules. In Section 3, we present our results
and the independence of axioms. Section 4 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model and Properties of Rules
There is an indivisible good, an object γ, and there are two agents: the dispossessed agent d and the owner
o. Each agent may consume either the object or a non-negative monetary compensation but not both. The
consumption space for each agent is {γ} ∪ R+. Each agent has preferences over the consumption space
which have a utility representation ud for the dispossessed agent and uo for the owner. We assume that for
each agent, there exists a finite compensation such that he is indifferent between receiving this amount of
compensation and getting the object. Let Vd and Vo be these compensations which we call the valuation
of the object for the dispossessed agent and the valuation of the owner, respectively. Then, ud(γ) = Vd and
uo(γ) = Vo, and for any compensation m ∈ R+, ud(m) = uo(m) = m. The compensation is given by a third
party, to which we refer to as the government. Let Vg > 0 be the maximum amount of money that the
government is willing to give as compensation.
Although (Vd, Vo, Vg) is the primitive of the problem, since Vg does not change throughout the paper,
we define a restitution problem as a pair (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. An allocation z ∈ ({γ} ∪ R+)2 is an assignment
of the object γ and a compensation m ≥ 0 such that z = (zd, zo) = (γ,m) or z = (zd, zo) = (m, γ). Let Z
be the set of allocations. A rule is a function ϕ : R2+ → Z that assigns to each problem an allocation such
that ϕ(Vd, Vo) = (ϕd(Vd, Vo), ϕo(Vd, Vo)). Note that an agent cannot receive the object and a compensation at
the same time. Moreover, a negative compensation is not allowed.
Next, we discuss several desirable properties of rules. Let ϕ be a rule. We are interested in rules that
are fair. One of the basic fairness requirements is envy-freeness, i.e., no agent should prefer the other agent’s
consumption to his own.
Envy-freeness: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, we have ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) ≥ ud(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) and uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) ≥
uo(ϕd(Vd, Vo)).
Since in a restitution problem the dispossessed agent is perceived as the victim and the “weakest”
agent, and thus should receive a more favorable treatment, we propose an asymmetric version of envy-
freeness that applies only to the dispossessed agent, dispossessed envy-freeness, i.e., the dispossessed agent
should not prefer the owner’s consumption to his own.5
Dispossessed envy-freeness: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, we have ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) ≥ ud(ϕo(Vd, Vo)).
5 Dispossessed envy-freeness is weaker than weak envy-freeness introduced in Andersson and Svensson (2008b). Weak
envy-freeness implies respecting priorities, which in our model would be equivalent to dispossessed envy-freeness when the
dispossessed agent were to have a higher priority.
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Strategic considerations lead to the next axiom. We may not know agents’ true valuations of the ob-
ject. As agents may behave strategically, we require strategy-proofness, i.e., no agent should benefit from
misrepresenting his valuation.
Strategy-proofness: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, each V ′d ∈ R+, each V ′o ∈ R+, we have ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) ≥
ud(ϕd(V
′
d, Vo)) and uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) ≥ uo(ϕo(Vd, V ′o)).
We also focus on possible joint manipulations by both agents. We study pair strategy-proofness, i.e., no
joint misrepresentation of valuations should make an agent better off without making the other worse off.
Pair strategy-proofness: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, there is no (V ′d, V ′o) ∈ R2+ such that for each i ∈ {d, o},
ui(ϕi(V
′
d, V
′
o)) ≥ ui(ϕi(Vd, Vo)) and for some i ∈ {d, o}, ui(ϕi(V ′d, V ′o)) > ui(ϕi(Vd, Vo)).
We consider a weaker version of the above property and study weak pair strategy-proofness, i.e., no joint
misrepresentation of valuations should make both agents better off.
Weak pair strategy-proofness: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, there is no (V ′d, V ′o) ∈ R2+ such that for each i ∈ {d, o},
ui(ϕi(V
′
d, V
′
o)) > ui(ϕi(Vd, Vo)).
Note that pair strategy-proofness implies weak pair strategy-proofness but not strategy-proofness.6
Since the compensation is provided by the government, there is a budget constraint. The government
can give at most the maximum compensation, Vg, to the agent who does not receive the object.
Government budget constraint: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and each i ∈ {d, o}, if ϕi(Vd, Vo) 6= γ, then
ϕi(Vd, Vo) ≤ Vg.
We consider rules that guarantee welfare lower bounds for the agents. The asymmetry of the problem
leads us to define two conditions. We consider dispossessed welfare lower bound, i.e., the dispossessed agent
should be given something at least as desirable as the object. Since the owner possesses the object, to
guarantee his participation it is enough to compensate him with the minimum of his valuation and the
maximum compensation. Hence, we consider owner welfare lower bound, i.e., the owner should either get the
object or should receive at least as much as the minimum of his valuation and the maximum compensation.
Dispossessed welfare lower bound: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, we have ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) ≥ Vd.
Owner welfare lower bound: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, we have uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}.
We are interested in rules for which small changes in the data of the problem do not cause large changes
in the chosen allocation in terms of the welfare of the dispossessed agent or the allocation of the object. We
consider continuity, i.e., small changes in the valuation of the owner should not cause large changes in the
welfare of the dispossessed agent. We also consider object continuity, i.e., if the dispossessed agent receives
the object, then small changes in the valuation of the dispossessed agent should not change the assignment
of the object.7
Continuity: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and each {V no }∞n=1 such that V no n→∞−−−−→ Vo, we have ud(ϕd(Vd, V no )) n→∞−−−−→
ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)).
Object continuity: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and each {V nd }∞n=1 such that V nd
n→∞−−−−→ Vd, if for each n = 1, 2, ...,
ϕd(V
n
d , Vo) = γ, then ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ.
6 Another property related to group manipulations in the literature is called group strategy-proofness, i.e., no subset of
agents should ever be able to make each of its members at least as well off, and at least one of them better off by jointly
misrepresenting their valuations. Note that pair strategy-proofness differs from group strategy-proofness, since we only
consider manipulations by the dispossessed agent and the owner simultaneously. Hence, unlike group strategy-proofness,
there is no logical relationship between pair strategy-proofness and strategy-proofness.
7 The two continuity properties jointly are weaker than the property of continuity of ϕ in both arguments.
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3 Results
3.1 Fairness and Incentive Compatibility
First, we show that there are envy-free and strategy-proof rules. In fact, there is essentially a unique rule.
Let (Vd, Vo) be a problem. If Vd > Vo, we show that by envy-freeness and strategy-proofness, the allocation is
(zd, zo) = (γ, Vd). Similarly, if Vd < Vo, the allocation is (zd, zo) = (Vo, γ). If Vd = Vo, the allocation is either
(γ, Vd) or (Vo, γ). A tie-breaking function θ is a function that maps each v ∈ R+ to either (γ, v) or (v, γ).
We define a family of rules in which each rule is associated with a tie-breaking function and vice versa each
tie-breaking function induces a rule. Formally, for a tie-breaking function θ,
ϕθ(Vd, Vo) =

(γ, Vd) if Vd > Vo;
(Vo, γ) if Vd < Vo;
θ(v) if Vd = Vo = v.
Proposition 1 A rule ϕ satisfies envy-freeness and strategy-proofness if and only if there is a tie-breaking
function θ such that ϕ = ϕθ.8
Remark 1 There is no rule that satisfies envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and government budget constraint
(since there are problems (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ such that Vg < max{Vd, Vo}). This impossibility result is not true
in the model where an agent can receive the object and a (positive or negative) monetary transfer that
cannot exceed some exogenously given upper bound (Sun and Yang, 2003; Ohseto, 2006; Svensson, 2009). 
In a restitution problem, the dispossessed agent is perceived as the victim and thus should receive a
more favorable treatment. In view of this observation and Remark 1, we are interested in dispossessed envy-
free and strategy-proof rules, i.e., a wider class of rules than those of Proposition 1. Before we present our
main results, it is convenient to introduce the so-called τ -m family. Each rule in this family is parametrized
by a “threshold function” τ and a “(monetary) compensation function” m. The threshold function τ is a
function of Vo. The dispossessed agent d receives the object if and only if Vd weakly exceeds the threshold.
In addition, the threshold function specifies the compensation for d when he does not get the object. The
compensation function m is a function of Vd, and specifies the compensation for the owner o when he does
not get the object. Note that how much o receives as a compensation only depends on Vd.
Formally, a threshold function is a function τ : R+ → R+ that
• is non-decreasing; for each V ′o , Vo ∈ R+ with V ′o > Vo, τ(V ′o) ≥ τ(Vo);
• is continuous; for each {V no }∞n=1 such that V no n→∞−−−−→ V , τ(V no ) n→∞−−−−→ τ(V ); and
• satisfies constant threshold ; if τ(Vo) < Vo, then for each V ′o > Vo, τ(V ′o) = τ(Vo).
Let T be set of all threshold functions. Before defining the compensation function, we introduce some
notation. For each Vd, let τ
−1(Vd) be the inverse image of τ at Vd, i.e., τ−1(Vd) = {vo ∈ R+ : τ(vo) =
Vd}. Note that possibly τ−1(Vd) = ∅. The valuation Vd can be of three different types according to the
characteristics of the associated τ−1(Vd).
Vd is of type

1© if τ−1(Vd) 6= ∅ and sup{τ−1(Vd)} <∞;
2© if τ−1(Vd) 6= ∅ and sup{τ−1(Vd)} =∞;
3© if τ−1(Vd) = ∅.
Note that since τ functions are non-decreasing and satisfy constant threshold, if Vd is of type 2©, Vd =
maxvo∈R+ τ(vo). See Fig. 1 for examples of τ and τ
−1(Vd).
A compensation function is used to determine a monetary compensation for the owner and hence is
defined over
Vd(τ) = {Vd ∈ R+ : there exists Vo ∈ R+ such that Vd ≥ τ(Vo)}.
Formally, a compensation function is a function m : Vd(τ)→ R+ such that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈
[l(Vd), u(Vd)] where the lower bound l(Vd) and upper bound u(Vd) are given by
9,10
8 Note that ϕθ is a Groves rule (Vickrey, 1961; Clark, 1971; Groves, 1973; Holmstro¨m, 1979). For the tightness of the
characterization, we refer to the Appendix.
9 Since τ is continuous, the maximum of τ−1(Vd) is well-defined.
10 Strictly speaking, the compensation function m depends on the threshold function τ . However, since there is no possible
confusion, we do not employ the notation mτ . Moreover, we introduce separate notation for the lower bound l(Vd) and the
upper bound u(Vd) of the compensation function to disclose the connection between the properties and the compensation
bounds separately.
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Fig. 1 Examples of τ functions. τ functions are non-decreasing, continuous, and satisfy constant threshold. In (a), τ
induces the envy-free and strategy-proof rule ϕθ (Proposition 1) where the tie-breaking function is θ(v) = (γ, v) for each
v ∈ R+. Moreover, Vd is of type 1©. In (b), τ does not start at the origin and Vd is of type 3©. In (c), Vd is of type 2©.
Finally, constant threshold implies that the function is constant after it intersects with the 45◦ line, but not in case of only
“touching” the 45◦ line as in (d). Moreover, in (d), Vd is of type 1©.
• l(Vd) =
{
max{τ−1(Vd)} if Vd is of type 1©;
0 if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
and
• u(Vd) =
{
l(Vd) if Vd is of type 1©;
Vd if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Note that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), l(Vd) ≤ u(Vd). Also, if Vd is of type 1©, then by constant threshold,
max{τ−1(Vd)} ≤ Vd. Therefore, for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ≤ Vd. Let M(τ) be the set of all compen-
sation functions for a given threshold function τ .
Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). We define the rule ϕτ,m as follows. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+,
ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ,m(Vd)) if Vd ≥ τ(Vo); (1a)
(τ(Vo), γ) if Vd < τ(Vo). (1b)
We call the family of rules induced by pairs (τ,m) with τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) the τ -m family.11 See Fig. 2
for examples of rules in this family.
Next, we present our first main result which is a characterization of the τ -m family.
Theorem 1 A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, and object conti-
nuity if and only if there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) such that ϕ = ϕτ,m.12
Moreover, each rule in the τ -m family is weakly pair strategy-proof.
11 The τ -m family is a subfamily of the rules characterized by Nisan (2007).
12 We provide a direct proof that does not exploit the characterization of strategy-proof rules in Nisan (2007). In our proof,
we can observe directly the implications of the properties for the threshold and the monetary compensation functions.
7
Fig. 2 Examples of rules in the τ -m family. In all cases (a)–(d), we consider problems (Vd, Vo) with Vd ≥ τ(Vo), i.e.,
where the owner receives a monetary compensation. In (a), Vd is of type 1© and the compensation is equal to the inverse
image of Vd under τ , which is a singleton. In (b), Vd is also of type 1© and the compensation is equal to the maximum of
the inverse image of Vd under τ . In (c), Vd is of type 2©. In (d), Vd is of type 3©. In both (c) and (d), the compensation
is chosen from the interval between 0 and Vd.
Proposition 2 Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). Then, ϕτ,m is weakly pair strategy-proof.
Some rules in the τ -m family are even pair strategy-proof.
Proposition 3 Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ). Then, ϕτ,m is pair strategy-proof if and only if for each Vo ∈ R+,
τ(Vo) = 0 and there exists a constant c ∈ R+ such that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) = R+, m(Vd) = c.
Remark 2 A rule is object efficient if the object is always allocated to an agent with the highest valuation.
Object-efficiency: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and each i, j ∈ {d, o} such that i 6= j, if Vi > Vj , then ϕi(Vd, Vo) = γ.
It is immediate to see that there are rules in the τ -m family that are not object-efficient. For example, in
Fig. 2 (c) and (d), although Vo > Vd, we have ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ. 
3.2 Government Budget Constraint
Next, we consider the budget constraint faced by the government, assuming that it can or is willing to spend
at most the maximum compensation and we obtain a subfamily of the τ -m family that satisfies government
budget constraint. In this subfamily, each threshold function is bounded above by Vg. Moreover, the upper
bound u(Vd) of each compensation function is min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Theorem 2 A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity,
and government budget constraint if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) are such that
– for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≤ Vg and
– for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with u(Vd) = min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Note that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), l(Vd) ≤ u(Vd). See Fig. 3 for examples of rules in this subfamily.
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Fig. 3 Examples of rules in the τ -m family satisfying government budget constraint. Note that in all cases (a)–(d), all τ
functions are bounded above by Vg . In both (c) and (d), Vd is of type 3© and the compensation is chosen from the interval
between 0 and min{Vd, Vg}.
3.3 Welfare Lower Bounds
Now, we consider properties that guarantee minimum welfare levels for the agents.
Remark 3 It is immediate to see that each rule in the τ -m family satisfies dispossessed welfare lower bound. 
The next result is the characterization of the subfamily of the τ -m family that satisfies also owner welfare
lower bound. In this subfamily, each threshold function is bounded below by min{Vo, Vg} and it cannot cross
the 45◦ line before the value of Vg. Moreover, the lower bound l(Vd) of each compensation function is
min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Theorem 3 A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity,
and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) are such that
– for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg} and
– for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with l(Vd) = min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Note that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), l(Vd) ≤ u(Vd). See Fig. 4 for examples of rules in this subfamily.
Our last result is the characterization of the subfamily of the τ -m family that satisfies both government
budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound. In this subfamily, each threshold function is bounded above
by Vg and bounded below by min{Vo, Vg} and it cannot cross the 45◦ line before the value of Vg. Moreover,
both the upper bound u(Vd) and the lower bound l(Vd) of each compensation function are equal to Vg if Vd
is of type 2© or 3©.
Theorem 4 A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity,
government budget constraint, and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m where τ ∈ T and
m ∈M(τ) are such that
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Fig. 4 Examples of rules in the τ -m family satisfying owner welfare lower bound. Note that in all cases (a)–(d), since for
each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}, τ cannot cross the 45◦ line before the value of Vg . In (d), Vd is of type 3© and the
compensation is between min{Vd, Vg} and Vd.
– for each Vo ∈ R+, min{Vo, Vg} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg and
– for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with l(Vd) = u(Vd) = Vg if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Note that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), l(Vd) ≤ u(Vd).13 See Fig. 5 for examples of rules in this subfamily. In
Table 1, we summarize our results and compare the threshold functions and the lower and upper bounds
for the compensation functions in each family in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Table 1 τ -m family and its subfamilies: We compare the threshold functions and the lower and upper bounds for the
compensation functions if Vd is of type 1©, 2© or 3© in each family in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4.
τ m
m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)]
Vd is 1© Vd is 2© or 3©
l(Vd) = u(Vd) l(Vd) u(Vd)
Theorem 1 [·Dispossessed envy-freeness τ ∈ T :
max{τ−1(Vd)} 0 Vd
·Strategy-proofness non-decreasing
·Continuity continuous
·Object continuity] constant threshold
Theorem 2 [· · · ·] τ ∈ T and
max{τ−1(Vd)} 0 min{Vd, Vg}+ Government budget constraint τ(Vo) ≤ Vg
Theorem 3 [· · · ·] τ ∈ T and
max{τ−1(Vd)} min{Vd, Vg} Vd+ Owner welfare lower bound min{Vg , Vo} ≤ τ(Vo)
Theorem 4 [· · · ·] τ ∈ T and
max{τ−1(Vd)} Vg Vg+ Government budget constraint min{Vg , Vo} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg
+ Owner welfare lower bound
13 Note that in Theorem 4, we show that min{Vd, Vg} = Vg .
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Fig. 5 Examples of rules in the τ -m family satisfying government budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound. Note
that in all cases (a)–(d), the τ functions are bounded above by Vg , and since for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}, τ
cannot cross the 45◦ line before the value of Vg . In (d), Vd is of type 3© and the compensation is equal to Vg .
3.4 Tightness of Characterizations
In this section, we prove the tightness of our characterizations in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4.14 Table 2
summarizes the independence of the properties.
Table 2 Tightness of the characterizations: The six rules show independence of axioms for the characterizations in
Theorems 1, 2, 3, and 4. The rule corresponding to a column satisfies (does not satisfy) the property corresponding to a
row if the associated cell contains a + (−).
Properties / Rules ϕG ϕmin,Vg ϕ◦ ϕ> ϕk>Vg ϕτ=m=0
Dispossessed envy-freeness − + + + + +
Strategy-proofness + − + + + +
Continuity + + − + + +
Object continuity + + + − + +
Government budget constraint + + + + − +
Owner welfare lower bound + + + + + −
Dispossessed welfare lower bound + + + + + +
Weak pair strategy-proofness + + + + + +
1. The rule ϕG is defined as ϕG(Vd, Vo) = (γ, Vg) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies strategy-proofness,
continuity, object continuity, owner welfare lower bound, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare
lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but not dispossessed envy-freeness.
2. The rule ϕmin,Vg is defined as
14 See the Appendix for the proofs of the independence of axioms.
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ϕmin,Vg (Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ,min{Vo, Vg}) if Vd ≥ Vg;
(Vg, γ) if Vd < Vg,
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, continuity, object continuity, owner welfare
lower bound, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness
but not strategy-proofness.
3. The rule ϕ◦ is defined as
ϕ◦(Vd, Vo) =

(γ, Vg) if Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd ≥ Vg;
(γ,
Vg
2 ) if Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd < Vg;
(Vg, γ) if Vd < τ(Vo) and Vo >
Vg
2 ;
(
Vg
2 , γ) if Vd < τ(Vo) and Vo ≤
Vg
2 ,
where τ(Vo) =
{
Vg
2 if Vo ≤
Vg
2 ;
Vg if Vo >
Vg
2 .
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, object continuity, owner
welfare lower bound, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-
proofness but not continuity.
4. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). The rule ϕ> is defined as
ϕ>(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ,m(Vd)) if Vd > τ(Vo);
(τ(Vo), γ) if Vd ≤ τ(Vo),
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, owner welfare
lower bound, government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness
but not object continuity.
5. Let k > Vg. The rule ϕ
k>Vg is defined as ϕk>Vg = ϕτ,m where for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = k and
each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) = Vd. It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object
continuity, owner welfare lower bound, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but
not government budget constraint.
6. The rule ϕτ=m=0 is defined as ϕτ=m=0 = ϕτ,m where for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = 0 and each Vd ∈
Vd(τ), m(Vd) = 0. It satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity,
government budget constraint, dispossessed welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness but not
owner welfare lower bound.
4 Concluding Remarks
We consider the allocation of an indivisible good when compensation, subject to a budget constraint, is
only possible for the agent who does not get the good. Our main result is the characterization of rules that
satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, and two continuity properties. We identify the subfamily
of rules that also satisfy government budget constraint and another subfamily of rules that also satisfy owner
welfare lower bound. Finally, we characterize the subfamily of rules that satisfy both properties, government
budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound.
In the context of land restitution in Colombia, which inspired our study, the government’s rule does not
satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness. However, in the family of the rules that we characterize, there are “simple”
rules that are easy to put in practice and satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness and government budget constraint.
As a selection among rules in the τ -m family, consider the rule that gives the land to the dispossessed agent
if and only if his valuation is at least the maximum compensation. The agent who does not get the land
receives the maximum compensation. This rule belongs to all the families we characterize in Theorems 1,
2, 3, and 4.
Additional fairness properties can be considered in our model. In the fairness literature, a weaker
property than envy-freeness, equal treatment of equals, has been studied. This property states that when
two agents are “equal,” they should receive the same consumption. In our model, equal treatment of equals
is impossible because of the restriction on consumption (an agent can only receive either the object or
money). As an alternative, we can consider a property that requires that when the dispossessed and the
owner have the same valuation of the object and this valuation is smaller than the government constraint,
both agents should receive the same in welfare terms. We call this property constrained equal treatment of
equals in welfare. There is a unique rule in the subfamily characterized in Theorem 4 that satisfies constrained
equal treatment of equals in welfare, where τ is the 45◦- line up to Vg and constant afterwards. Moreover, this
rule minimizes envy among the rules in the τ -m family that satisfy government budget constraint.
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Finally, we could ask how the government should select the τ function. The government may not know
the exact valuations of the dispossessed agent and the owner. But if the uncertainty of the government can
be modeled as a probability distribution over the valuations, then it could decide to choose a τ function
that gives the object to the dispossessed agent more often in expectation, or that minimizes the expected
compensation. In case the set of possible valuations is uniformly distributed over a finite rectangle containing
the origin, the τ function that coincides with the 45◦- line up to Vg gives the object to the dispossessed
agent more often in expectation. In case there is a degenerate mass at the valuation of the owner, then again
the τ function that coincides with the 45◦- line up to Vg minimizes the expected government expenditure.
Possible future research could tackle a generalization of our model where an owner has more than one
piece of land or the dispossessed agent has preferences over multiple pieces of land and may receive a piece
of land that he did not possess before.
Appendix
Proposition 1. A rule ϕ satisfies envy-freeness and strategy-proofness if and only if there is a tie-breaking
function θ such that ϕ = ϕθ.
Proof. It is easy to check that ϕθ satisfies envy-freeness and strategy-proofness. We prove that if ϕ is envy-free
and strategy-proof, then there is a tie-breaking function θ such that ϕ = ϕθ. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
By envy-freeness, if an agent has a strictly higher valuation than the other agent, then the former gets
the object (Svensson, 1983).
Next, we show that the agent who does not get the object receives a compensation equal to the other
agent’s valuation. Without loss of generality, assume that ϕd(Vd, Vo) 6= γ. By envy-freeness, Vo ≥ Vd. We
need to show that ϕd(Vd, Vo) = Vo. By envy-freeness, Vd ≤ ϕd(Vd, Vo) ≤ Vo. Suppose ϕd(Vd, Vo) < Vo. Let V ′d
be such that ϕd(Vd, Vo) < V
′
d < Vo. Then, by envy-freeness (the owner gets the object at (V
′
d, Vo)), we have
Vd < V
′
d ≤ ϕd(V ′d, Vo) ≤ Vo. Then, ud(ϕd(V ′d, Vo)) ≥ V ′d > ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)). So, V ′d is a profitable manipulation
for the dispossessed agent at (Vd, Vo) in violation of strategy-proofness. Hence, ϕd(Vd, Vo) = Vo.
Finally, if Vd = Vo = v, then by the previous arguments, ϕ(Vd, Vo) = (γ, Vd) or ϕ(Vd, Vo) = (Vo, γ). Let θ
be the function such that for each v ∈ R+, θ(v) = ϕ(v, v). Then, ϕ = ϕθ.
Tightness of the characterization in Proposition 1:
1. The rule ϕG is defined as ϕG(Vd, Vo) = (γ, Vg) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies strategy-proofness but
not envy-freeness.
Proof. Since the allocation is independent of the reported valuations of the agents, ϕG is strategy-proof.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vd < Vg. Then, ud(ϕGd (Vd, Vo)) = Vd < Vg = ud(ϕGo (Vd, Vo)) which is a
contradiction to envy-freeness.
2. The rule ϕ≥ is defined as
ϕ≥(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ, Vo) if Vd ≥ Vo;
(Vd, γ) if Vd < Vo,
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. It satisfies envy-freeness but not strategy-proofness.
Proof. It is to easy to see that ϕ≥ is envy-free. If Vd ≥ Vo, the dispossessed agent gets the object and the
owner receives Vo ≤ Vd. If Vd < Vo, the owner gets the object and the dispossessed agent receives Vd < Vo.
To see that ϕ≥ is not strategy-proof, let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vd > Vo. Then, ϕ≥(Vd, Vo) =
(γ, Vo). Let V
′
o such that Vd ≥ V ′o > Vo. Then, ϕ≥(Vd, V ′o) = (γ, V ′o). Hence, uo(ϕ≥o (Vd, V ′o)) = V ′o > Vo =
uo(ϕ
≥
o (Vd, Vo)). Then, V
′
o is a profitable manipulation for the owner at (Vd, Vo). Hence, ϕ
≥ is not strategy-
proof.
Theorem 1. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, and object conti-
nuity if and only if there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) such that ϕ = ϕτ,m.
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Proof.
(⇒) Let ϕ be dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous. We need to show that
there exist a threshold function τ ∈ T and a compensation function m ∈M(τ) such that ϕ = ϕτ,m.
First, we construct the threshold function τ (using Lemma 1). Second, we determine the possible com-
pensations for the dispossessed agent when he does not get the object (Lemma 2). Third, we establish that
τ ∈ T by showing that the threshold function is non-decreasing, continuous, and satisfies constant threshold.
To prove the continuity of τ , we first show that ϕ satisfies another type of continuity (Lemma 3). Finally,
we construct the compensation function m and show that m ∈M(τ).
Let D1 = {(vd, vo) ∈ R2+ : ϕd(vd, vo) = γ} and D2 = {(vd, vo) ∈ R2+ : ϕo(vd, vo) = γ}. Let f : D1 → R+ be
defined as f(Vd, Vo) = ϕo(Vd, Vo) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ D1. Let g : D2 → R+ be defined as g(Vd, Vo) = ϕd(Vd, Vo)
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ D2. Since ϕ is dispossessed envy-free, for each Vd ∈ R+ and Vo, V ′o ∈ R+ with (Vd, Vo) ∈ D1
and (Vd, V
′
o) ∈ D2, we have
f(Vd, Vo) ≤ Vd ≤ g(Vd, V ′o). (2)
Lemma 1 Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ. Let V ′d > Vd. Then, ϕd(V ′d, Vo) = γ.
Proof. Suppose ϕd(V
′
d, Vo) 6= γ. Then, by dispossessed envy-freeness, ud(ϕd(V ′d, Vo)) = ϕd(V ′d, Vo) ≥ V ′d > Vd =
ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)). Then, V
′
d is a profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent at (Vd, Vo) in violation of
strategy-proofness. Hence, ϕd(V
′
d, Vo) = γ.
In view of Lemma 1 and given the valuation of the owner Vo, we define the infimum of the valuations
of the dispossessed agent that give him the object. Formally, τ(Vo) ≡ inf{Vd : ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ}. Then, by
the definition of τ(Vo) and Lemma 1, we know that if Vd > τ(Vo), then ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ and if Vd < τ(Vo),
then ϕo(Vd, Vo) = γ. Now, let Vd = τ(Vo). Consider a sequence {V nd }∞n=1 = Vd + 1n > Vd. Then, for each
n = 1, 2, ..., ϕd(V
n
d , Vo) = γ. Since ϕ is object continuous, ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ. Therefore,
ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ if Vd ≥ τ(Vo);
ϕo(Vd, Vo) = γ if Vd < τ(Vo).
(3)
Lemma 2 Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. If Vd < τ(Vo), then g(Vd, Vo) = τ(Vo).
Proof. Let Vo ∈ R+. Assume τ(Vo) > 0. (Otherwise, the statement holds trivially.)
Step 1: There exists t such that for each Vd < τ(Vo), g(Vd, Vo) = t.
Suppose it is not the case. Then, there are Vd < τ(Vo) and V
′
d < τ(Vo) such that ϕd(V
′
d, Vo) = g(V
′
d, Vo) 6=
g(Vd, Vo) = ϕd(Vd, Vo). Without loss of generality, assume that ϕd(V
′
d, Vo) > ϕd(Vd, Vo). Then, V
′
d is a
profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent at (Vd, Vo) in violation of strategy-proofness. Hence, there
exists t such that for each Vd < τ(Vo), g(Vd, Vo) = t.
Step 2: t ≥ τ(Vo).
Suppose t < τ(Vo). Let Vd be such that t < Vd < τ(Vo) and V
′
d ≡ τ(Vo). Then, if Vd is the dispossessed
agent’s valuation, he can report V ′d instead and obtain ud(ϕd(V
′
d, Vo)) = Vd > t = ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)). Then, V
′
d
is a profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent at (Vd, Vo) in violation of strategy-proofness.
Step 3: t ≤ τ(Vo).
Suppose t > τ(Vo). Let Vd, V
′
d be such that t > V
′
d > τ(Vo) > Vd. Then, if V
′
d is the dispossessed agent’s
valuation, he can report Vd instead and obtain ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) = t > V
′
d = ud(ϕd(V
′
d, Vo)). Then, Vd is a
profitable manipulation for the dispossessed agent at (V ′d, Vo) in violation of strategy-proofness.
Therefore, for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ with Vd < τ(Vo), we have g(Vd, Vo) = τ(Vo).
Therefore, Equation (1b) holds. Next, we show that τ ∈ T .
I τ is non-decreasing.
Suppose τ is not non-decreasing. Then, there exist Vo, V
′
o ∈ R+ such that Vo < V ′o and τ(V ′o) < τ(Vo).
By Equation (3), there is Vd such that ϕo(Vd, Vo) = γ and ϕo(Vd, V
′
o) 6= γ. Then, ϕo(Vd, V ′o) = f(Vd, V ′o).
Suppose Vo is the valuation of the owner. Then, by strategy-proofness, we have Vo = uo(γ) = uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) ≥
uo(ϕo(Vd, V
′
o)) = f(Vd, V
′
o). Now, suppose V
′
o is the valuation of the owner. Then, by strategy-proofness, we
have V ′o = uo(γ) = uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) ≤ uo(ϕo(Vd, V ′o)) = f(Vd, V ′o). Hence, V ′o ≤ f(Vd, V ′o) ≤ Vo contradicting
Vo < V
′
o . Therefore, τ is non-decreasing.
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I τ is continuous.
Let Vo ∈ R+. We show that τ is right-continuous and left-continuous at Vo.
Step 1: τ is right-continuous at Vo.
Let {V no }∞n=1 be such that V no is non-increasing in n and V no n→∞−−−−→ Vo. Let Vd ≡ τ(Vo). Since for each
n = 1, 2, ..., V no ≥ Vo and τ is non-decreasing, we have τ(V no ) ≥ τ(Vo) = Vd. Hence, ud(ϕd(Vd, V no )) = τ(V no )
and ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) = τ(Vo). Since ϕ is continuous, τ(V
n
o )
n→∞−−−−→ τ(Vo). Hence, τ is right-continuous at Vo.
Before proving τ is left-continuous at Vo, we show that ϕ satisfies another type of continuity.
Lemma 3 Let ϕ be dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous. Let {V no }∞n=1
be such that (i) V no
n→∞−−−−→ Vo and (ii) for each n = 1, 2, ..., ϕd(Vd, V no ) = γ. Then, ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ.15
Proof. Suppose ϕd(Vd, Vo) 6= γ. Note that ud(ϕd(Vd, V no )) = Vd. Then, for each n = 1, 2, ..., τ(V no ) ≤ Vd and
τ(Vo) > Vd. Since ϕ is continuous, Vd = ud(ϕd(Vd, V
n
o ))
n→∞−−−−→ ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)). By Lemma 2, ud(ϕd(Vd, Vo)) =
τ(Vo). Hence, τ(Vo) = Vd contradicting τ(Vo) > Vd.
Step 2: τ is left-continuous at Vo.
Assume that τ is not left-continuous at Vo. Let {V no }∞n=1 be such that V no is non-decreasing and V no n→∞−−−−→ Vo
and τ(V no ) does not converge to τ(Vo). Since V
n
o is non-decreasing and τ is non-decreasing, τ(V
n
o ) is a
non-decreasing sequence, bounded by τ(Vo). Hence, there exists V
∗ ≡ limn→∞ τ(V no ) such that for each
n = 1, 2, ..., τ(V no ) ≤ V ∗. Since τ is not left-continuous at Vo, V ∗ 6= τ(Vo). Hence, V ∗ < τ(Vo). Let Vd be
such that V ∗ < Vd < τ(Vo). Then, for each n = 1, 2, ..., τ(V no ) ≤ V ∗ < Vd and, hence, ϕd(Vd, V no ) = γ. By
Lemma 3, ϕd(Vd, Vo) = γ contradicting Vd < τ(Vo).
I τ satisfies constant threshold.
Let τ(Vo) < Vo and V
′
o > Vo. Suppose τ(V
′
o) 6= τ(Vo). Since τ is non-decreasing, τ(V ′o) > τ(Vo).
Let Vd be such that τ(Vo) < Vd < min{Vo, τ(V ′o)}. Suppose Vo is the valuation of the owner. Then,
uo(ϕo(Vd, Vo)) = f(Vd, Vo). By Equation (2), f(Vd, Vo) ≤ Vd < Vo. The owner can report V ′o instead and
obtain uo(ϕo(Vd, V
′
o)) = uo(γ) = Vo. Then, V
′
o is a profitable manipulation for the owner at (Vd, Vo) in
violation of strategy-proofness. Hence, τ satisfies constant threshold.
We have shown that τ ∈ T . We now construct a function m ∈M(τ) and show Equation (1a) in three steps.
Step 1: For each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) and Vo, V ′o ∈ R+ such that Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd ≥ τ(V ′o), we have f(Vd, Vo) =
f(Vd, V
′
o).
Let Vo, V
′
o ∈ R+ and Vd ∈ Vd(τ) such that Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd ≥ τ(V ′o). Then, by Equation (2), ϕo(Vd, Vo) =
f(Vd, Vo) and ϕo(Vd, V
′
o) = f(Vd, V
′
o). Since ϕ is strategy-proof, f(Vd, Vo) = f(Vd, V
′
o).
Step 2: Let m : Vd(τ)→ R+ be defined as m(Vd) = f(Vd, Vo) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ with Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Note
that by Equation (2), m(Vd) ≤ Vd for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ).
Step 3: For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ with Vd ≥ τ(Vo), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)].
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ with Vd ≥ τ(Vo). By Step 2, we are done if Vd is of type 2© or 3©. Let Vd be of type 1©.
Then, there exists Vo such that τ(Vo) = Vd. Let V
′
o > Vo be such that τ(V
′
o) > τ(Vo). (See Fig. 2(a) and
(b).) Then, ϕo(Vd, V
′
o) = γ. If ϕo(Vd, Vo) = m(Vd) < Vo, then V
′
o is a profitable manipulation for the owner
at (Vd, Vo) in violation of strategy-proofness. Hence, m(Vd) ≥ Vo.
Using the previous arguments, we have that m(Vd) ≥ V˜o for each V˜o with τ(V˜o) ≤ Vd. Hence, m(Vd) ≥
supV˜o{V˜o|τ(V˜o) ≤ Vd}. Since τ is non-decreasing and continuous, m(Vd) ≥ maxV˜o{V˜o|τ(V˜o) = Vd}. Then,
m(Vd) ≥ max{τ−1(Vd)}.
Suppose m(Vd) 6= max{τ−1(Vd)}. Then, ϕo(Vd, Vo) = m(Vd) > max{τ−1(Vd)}. Let V ′′o be such that
max{τ−1(Vd)} < V ′′o < m(Vd). Then, ϕo(Vd, V ′′o ) = γ. Then, Vo is a profitable manipulation for the owner
at (Vd, V
′′
o ) in violation of strategy-proofness. Hence, m(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)}.
(⇐) We need to show that ϕτ,m is dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous.
I ϕτ,m is dispossessed envy-free.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Case 1: Vd ≥ τ(Vo).
15 Note that this continuity property is based on a sequence of valuations of the owner (i.e., not valuations of the
dispossessed agent as in object continuity).
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Then, we have ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = ud(γ) = Vd. Note that if Vd is of type 1©, m(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)}.
By constant threshold, max{τ−1(Vd)} ≤ Vd. If Vd is of type 2© or 3©, m(Vd) ≤ u(Vd) = Vd. Hence,
ud(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo)) ≤ Vd = ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)).
Case 2: Vd < τ(Vo).
Then, we have ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = τ(Vo) > Vd = ud(γ) = ud(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo)).
Therefore, the dispossessed agent never envies the owner.
I ϕτ,m is strategy-proof.
We show that the rule is strategy-proof for each agent.
Step 1: ϕτ,m is strategy-proof for the dispossessed agent.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Case 1: Vd ≥ τ(Vo).
Then, ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = ud(γ) = Vd. Let V
′
d 6= Vd. If V ′d ≥ τ(Vo), then ud(ϕτ,md (V ′d, Vo)) = ud(γ) = Vd. If
V ′d < τ(Vo), then ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (V
′
d, Vo)) = ud(τ(Vo)) = τ(Vo) ≤ Vd. So, there is no profitable manipulation for the
dispossessed agent.
Case 2: Vd < τ(Vo).
Then, ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = ud(τ(Vo)) = τ(Vo). Let V
′
d 6= Vd. If V ′d < τ(Vo), then ud(ϕτ,md (V ′d, Vo)) =
ud(τ(Vo)) = τ(Vo). If V
′
d ≥ τ(Vo), then ud(ϕτ,md (V ′d, Vo)) = ud(γ) = Vd < τ(Vo). So, there is no profitable
manipulation for the dispossessed agent.
Therefore, ϕτ,m is strategy-proof for the dispossessed agent.
Step 2: ϕτ,m is strategy-proof for the owner.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Case 1: Vd ≥ τ(Vo).
At (Vd, Vo), the owner does not get the object and receives ϕo(Vd, Vo) = m(Vd). Let V
′
o 6= Vo. The owner
changes the allocation if and only if Vd < τ(V
′
o) and in that case it is profitable if and only if Vo > m(Vd).
So, assume Vd < τ(V
′
o). We show that Vo ≤ l(Vd). So, there is no profitable manipulation for the owner.
Since τ(V ′o) > Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and τ is continuous and satisfies constant threshold, τ−1(Vd) 6= ∅ and
max{τ−1(Vd)} <∞. Then, Vd is of type 1© and l(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)} ≥ Vo.
Case 2: Vd < τ(Vo).
Obviously, Vd can only be of type 1© or 3©. The owner gets the object at (Vd, Vo). The only possible candidate
for a profitable manipulation is V ′o < Vo such that τ(V ′o) ≤ Vd provided that Vo < m(Vd). We show that
Vo ≥ u(Vd). So, there is no profitable manipulation for the owner.
If Vd is of type 3©, then τ−1(Vd) = ∅. Since τ is continuous and τ(Vo) > Vd ≥ τ(V ′o), there is some V ′′o
with τ(V ′′o ) = Vd contradicting τ−1(Vd) = ∅.
If Vd is of type 1©, then u(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)}. So, τ(u(Vd)) = Vd. Since τ(Vo) > Vd and τ is non-
decreasing, u(Vd) < Vo.
Therefore, ϕτ,m is strategy-proof for the owner.
Therefore, ϕτ,m is strategy-proof.
I ϕτ,m is continuous.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and {V no }∞n=1 such that V no n→∞−−−−→ Vo. Since τ is continuous, τ(V no ) n→∞−−−−→ τ(Vo).
Case 1: There exists N such that for each n ≥ N , Vd ≥ τ(V no ).
Since τ(V no )
n→∞−−−−→ τ(Vo), Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Therefore, for each n ≥ N , we have ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, V no )) = ud(γ) = Vd =
ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)).
Case 2: There exists N such that for each n ≥ N , Vd < τ(V no ).
Since τ(V no )
n→∞−−−−→ τ(Vo), Vd ≤ τ(Vo). Then, either Vd < τ(Vo) in which case we have for each n ≥ N ,
ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, V
n
o )) = τ(V
n
o )
n→∞−−−−→ τ(Vo) = ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)) or Vd = τ(Vo) in which case we have for each
n ≥ N , ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, V no )) = τ(V no )
n→∞−−−−→ τ(Vo) = Vd = ud(γ) = ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)).
Case 3: For each N , there exist n ≥ N with Vd ≥ τ(V no ) and n′ ≥ N with Vd < τ(V n
′
o ).
Let V i1o , V
i2
o , ... and V
j1
o , V
j2
o , ... be two infinite subsequences of V
1
o , V
2
o , ... such that {i1, i2, ...}∪{j1, j2, ...} =
{1, 2, ...}, Vd ≥ τ(V iko ) for each k = 1, 2, ..., and Vd < τ(V jko ) for each k = 1, 2, .... Now, let Vok ≡ V iko and
Vo
k ≡ V jko for each k = 1, 2, .... Note that Vo1, Vo2, ... and Vo1, Vo2, ... complement one another (with respect
to the original sequence V 1o , V
2
o , ...).
Since V no
n→∞−−−−→ Vo, we have Von n→∞−−−−→ Vo and Von n→∞−−−−→ Vo. By the continuity of τ , τ(Von) n→∞−−−−→ τ(Vo)
and τ(Vo
n)
n→∞−−−−→ τ(Vo). By arguments similar to Case 1, ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo
n
))
n→∞−−−−→ ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)) and
by arguments similar to Case 2, ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo
n))
n→∞−−−−→ ud(ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo)). Since the two subsequences
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Vo
1
, Vo
2
, ... and Vo
1, Vo
2, ... complement one another with respect to the original sequence V 1o , V
2
o , ..., it
follows that ϕτ,m is continuous.
I ϕτ,m is object continuous.
Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and {V nd }∞n=1 be such that V nd
n→∞−−−−→ Vd. Assume that for each n = 1, 2, ..., ϕτ,md (V nd , Vo) =
γ. Then, for each n = 1, 2, ..., we have V nd ≥ τ(Vo). Hence, Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo) = γ. Therefore, ϕτ,m
is object continuous.
Therefore, ϕτ,m is dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, continuous, and object continuous.
Proposition 2. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). Then, ϕτ,m is weakly pair strategy-proof.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. Assume that the owner receives the object. Then, Vd < τ(Vo) and ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) =
(τ(Vo), γ). The only possible manipulation that might make both of them better off is (V
′
d, V
′
o) such that
ϕτ,m(V ′d, V
′
o) = (γ,m(V
′
d)). Then, τ(Vo) > Vd = ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (V
′
d, V
′
o)), which means the dispossessed agent is
worse off. Hence, there is no profitable joint manipulation that makes both of them better off.
Next, assume that the dispossessed agent receives the object. Then, Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) =
(γ,m(Vd)). The only possible manipulation that might make both of them better off is (V
′
d, V
′
o) such
that ϕτ,m(V ′d, V
′
o) = (τ(V
′
o), γ). Suppose (V
′
d, V
′
o) is a profitable manipulation. Then, τ(V
′
o) > Vd ≥ τ(Vo).
Hence, Vd is of type 1©, i.e., m(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)}. Since (V ′d, V ′o) is profitable, Vo > m(Vd). Then,
Vo > max{τ−1(Vd)}. Since τ is non-decreasing, τ(Vo) > Vd, contradicting Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Hence, there is no
profitable joint manipulation that makes both of them better off. Therefore, ϕτ,m is weakly pair strategy-
proof.
Proposition 3. Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). Then, ϕτ,m is pair strategy-proof if and only if for each Vo ∈ R+,
τ(Vo) = 0 and there exists a constant c ∈ R+ such that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) = R+, m(Vd) = c.
Proof.
(⇒) Let τ ∈ T , m ∈M(τ), and ϕτ,m be pair strategy-proof.
Step 1: There is a constant k ∈ R+ such that for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = k.
Suppose it is not the case. Then, there exist Vo and V
′
o such that τ(Vo) 6= τ(V ′o). Without loss of
generality, assume that Vo < V
′
o . Since τ is non-decreasing, τ(Vo) < τ(V
′
o). Since τ is continuous, there exists
V ′′o such that τ(Vo) < τ(V ′′o ) < τ(V ′o). Let Vd be such that Vd < τ(V ′′o ). Then, ϕτ,m(Vd, V ′′o ) = (τ(V ′′o ), γ)
and ϕτ,m(Vd, V
′
o) = (τ(V
′
o), γ). Then, uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, V
′′
o )) = uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, V
′
o)) and ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, V
′′
o )) = τ(V
′′
o ) <
τ(V ′o) = ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, V
′
o)). Hence, (Vd, V
′
o) is a profitable joint manipulation at (Vd, V
′′
o ), in violation of pair
strategy-proofness.
Step 2: There is a constant c ∈ R+ such that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) = c.
Suppose it is not the case. Then, there exist Vd, V
′
d ∈ Vd(τ) such that m(Vd) 6= m(V ′d). Let Vo and V ′o
be such that Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and V ′d ≥ τ(V ′o). Without loss of generality, assume that m(Vd) < m(V ′d). Then,
ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) = (γ,m(Vd)) and ϕ
τ,m(V ′d, V
′
o) = (γ,m(V
′
d)). Then, ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) = ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (V
′
d, V
′
o)) and
uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (V
′
d, V
′
o)) = m(V
′
d) > m(Vd) = uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo)). Hence, (V
′
d, V
′
o) is a profitable joint manipulation at
(Vd, Vo), in violation of pair strategy-proofness.
Summarizing Steps 1 and 2,
ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ, c) if Vd ≥ k;
(k, γ) if Vd < k.
Step 3: k = 0.
Suppose it is not the case. Then, k > 0. Let (Vd, Vo) be such that Vd = k and Vo > c. Let V
′
d < Vd. Then,
ϕτ,m(V ′d, Vo) = (k, γ) and ϕ
τ,m(Vd, Vo) = (γ, c). Then, ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (V
′
d, Vo)) = k = Vd = ud(ϕ
τ,m
d (Vd, Vo)) and
uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (V
′
d, Vo)) = Vo > c = uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo)). Hence, (V
′
d, Vo) is a profitable joint manipulation at (Vd, Vo),
in violation of pair strategy-proofness.
(⇐) For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, ϕτ=0,m=c(Vd, Vo) = (γ, c). Hence, there is no profitable joint manipulation.
Therefore, ϕτ=0,m=c is pair strategy-proof.
Theorem 2. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity,
and government budget constraint if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) are such that
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– for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≤ Vg and
– for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with u(Vd) = min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Proof.
(⇒) By Theorem 1, we know that there exist a threshold function τ ∈ T and a compensation function
m ∈ M(τ). Since ϕ satisfies government budget constraint, for each (Vd, Vo), if Vd < τ(Vo), then τ(Vo) ≤ Vg
(?), and if Vd ≥ τ(Vo), then m(Vd) ≤ Vg (??).
I For each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≤ Vg. (•)
If τ(Vo) = 0, then τ(Vo) ≤ Vg. If τ(Vo) 6= 0, then by taking Vd = 0 in (?), τ(Vo) ≤ Vg.
I For each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) that is of type 2© or 3©, m(Vd) ≤ min{Vd, Vg}.
Let Vd ∈ Vd(τ) be of type 2© or 3©. If Vd ≤ Vg, then by the definition of m, m(Vd) ≤ Vd = min{Vd, Vg}. So,
suppose Vd > Vg. By (•), for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≤ Vg < Vd. Then, Vd is of type 3©. Let Vo ∈ R+. By (??),
m(Vd) ≤ Vg = min{Vd, Vg}.
Therefore, the threshold function τ and the compensation function m satisfy the conditions in the
statement of the theorem.
(⇐) Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ) satisfy the conditions in the statement of the theorem. We show that
ϕτ,m satisfies government budget constraint. (By Theorem 1, ϕτ,m satisfies the other properties described in
Theorem 2.)
Suppose Vd < τ(Vo). Then, ϕ
τ,m(Vd, Vo) = (τ(Vo), γ). Since for each V
′
o ∈ R+, τ(V ′o) ≤ Vg, we have
ϕτ,md (Vd, Vo) ≤ Vg.
Suppose Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Then, ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) = (γ,m(Vd)).
If Vd is of type 1©, then m(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)} ≤ Vg. To see this, suppose max{τ−1(Vd)} > Vg. Since Vd
is of type 1©, by constant threshold max{τ−1(Vd)} ≤ Vd. Then, Vg < max{τ−1(Vd)} ≤ Vd. Since τ(Vo) ≤ Vg,
we have τ(Vo) < Vd contradicting Vd ≥ τ(Vo).
If Vd is of type 2© or 3©, then m(Vd) ≤ min{Vd, Vg}. Hence, ϕτ,mo (Vd, Vo) ≤ Vg. Therefore, ϕτ,m satisfies
government budget constraint.
Theorem 3. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity,
and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m where τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) are such that
– for each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg} and
– for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with l(Vd) = min{Vd, Vg} if Vd is of type 2© or 3©.
Proof.
(⇒) By Theorem 1, we know that there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) such that ϕ = ϕτ,m.
I For each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}. (♦)
Suppose that there exists Vo such that τ(Vo) < min{Vo, Vg}. Let Vd be such that τ(Vo) < Vd < min{Vo, Vg}.
Then, ϕo(Vd, Vo) = m(Vd). By the definition of m, m(Vd) ≤ Vd. Hence, m(Vd) < min{Vo, Vg} in violation of
owner welfare lower bound.
I For each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) that is of type 2© or 3©, m(Vd) ≥ min{Vd, Vg}.
Let Vd ∈ Vd(τ) be of type 2© or 3©. Let Vo be such that Vd ≥ τ(Vo). Then, ϕτ,m(Vd, Vo) = (γ,m(Vd)).
Case 1: Vd is of type 2©.
Subcase 1.1: Vd ≥ Vg.
Suppose m(Vd) < Vg. Let V
′
o ∈ (m(Vd), Vg). Since Vd is of type 2©, Vd ≥ τ(V ′o). Then, ϕτ,m(Vd, V ′o) =
(γ,m(Vd)). By owner welfare lower bound and V
′
o < Vg, m(Vd) ≥ V ′o contradicting the choice of V ′o . Hence,
m(Vd) ≥ Vg = min{Vd, Vg}.
Subcase 1.2: Vd < Vg.
Suppose m(Vd) < Vd. Let ε > 0 be such that m(Vd) + ε ≤ Vd. Since Vd is of type 2© and τ satisfies constant
threshold, we have min(τ−1(Vd)) ≤ Vd. Let V ′o = max{min(τ−1(Vd)),m(Vd) + ε}. Note that V ′o ≤ Vd. Since
Vd is of type 2© and τ satisfies constant threshold, Vd = τ(V ′o). Then, ϕτ,m(Vd, V ′o) = (γ,m(Vd)). By owner
welfare lower bound and V ′o ≤ Vd < Vg, m(Vd) ≥ V ′o . However, by the choice of V ′o , V ′o ≥ m(Vd) + ε > m(Vd)
contradicting m(Vd) ≥ V ′o . Hence, m(Vd) ≥ Vd = min{Vd, Vg}.
Case 2: Vd is of type 3©.
Subcase 2.1: Vd ≥ Vg.
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Suppose m(Vd) < Vg. Let V
′
o ∈ (m(Vd), Vg). Let V ? ≡ maxvo τ(vo). (Note that V ? is well-defined because
Vd ∈ Vd(τ) is of type 3©.) Since Vd is of type 3©, Vd > V ? ≥ τ(V ′o). Then, ϕτ,m(Vd, V ′o) = (γ,m(Vd)). By
owner welfare lower bound and V ′o < Vg, m(Vd) ≥ V ′o contradicting the choice of V ′o . Hence, m(Vd) ≥ Vg =
min{Vd, Vg}.
Subcase 2.2: Vd < Vg.
Let Vo > Vd. Since Vd is of type 3©, τ(Vo) < Vd. Then, τ(Vo) < min{Vo, Vg} contradicting (♦).
Therefore, the threshold function τ and the compensation function m satisfy the conditions in the
statement of the theorem.
(⇐) Let τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ) satisfy the conditions in the statement of the theorem. We show that
ϕτ,m satisfies owner welfare lower bound. (By Theorem 1, ϕτ,m satisfies the other properties described in
Theorem 3.) Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
If ϕτ,mo (Vd, Vo) = γ, then immediately uo(ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo)) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}. If ϕτ,mo (Vd, Vo) 6= γ, then Vd ≥ τ(Vo).
By the definition of τ , τ(Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}. Hence, Vd ≥ min{Vo, Vg}.
We now check that m(Vd) = ϕ
τ,m
o (Vd, Vo) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}.
If Vd is of type 1©, then m(Vd) = max{τ−1(Vd)}. Since τ is non-decreasing and Vd ≥ τ(Vo),
max{τ−1(Vd)} ≥ Vo. Hence, m(Vd) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}.
If Vd is of type 2© or 3©, m(Vd) ≥ min{Vd, Vg}. Since Vd ≥ min{Vo, Vg}, m(Vd) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}. Therefore,
ϕτ,m satisfies owner welfare lower bound.
Theorem 4. A rule ϕ satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity,
government budget constraint, and owner welfare lower bound if and only if ϕ = ϕτ,m where τ ∈ T and
m ∈M(τ) are such that
– for each Vo ∈ R+, min{Vo, Vg} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg and (∗)
– for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) ∈ [l(Vd), u(Vd)] with l(Vd) = u(Vd) = Vg if Vd is of type 2© or 3©. (∗∗)
Proof. Let τ ∈ T be such that for each Vo, min{Vg, Vo} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg. Let Vd ∈ Vd(τ) be of type 2© or 3©. We
show that min{Vd, Vg} = Vg. Since for each Vo, min{Vg, Vo} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg, it follows that for each V ′o > Vg,
Vg = τ(V
′
o). Hence, Vg = maxvo∈R+ τ(vo). Since Vd is of type 2© or 3©, maxvo∈R+ τ(vo) ≤ Vd. Hence, Vg ≤ Vd.
Therefore, min{Vd, Vg} = Vg. (4)
(⇒) By Theorems 2 and 3, we know that there exist τ ∈ T and m ∈ M(τ) such that ϕ = ϕτ,m and for
each Vo ∈ R+, min{Vo, Vg} ≤ τ(Vo) ≤ Vg (∗). It remains to show that for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) of type 2© or
3©, l(Vd) = u(Vd) = Vg. By (∗) and (4), for each Vd of type 2© or 3©, l(Vd) = u(Vd) = min{Vd, Vg} = Vg.
Therefore, the threshold function τ and the compensation function m satisfy the conditions in the statement
of the theorem.
(⇐) Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ) satisfy the conditions in the statement of the theorem. By (∗), (∗∗), and (4),
for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ) of type 2© or 3©, l(Vd) = u(Vd) = Vg = min{Vd, Vg}. Then, by Theorems 2 and 3, ϕτ,m
satisfies all properties described in Theorem 4.
Tightness of the characterizations:
For each rule in the following examples, we indicate the unique axiom in the statement of Theorem 4 that
the rule does not satisfy. We also show that each of these rules satisfy dispossessed welfare lower bound and
weak pair strategy-proofness. See Table 2 for a summary.
1. Dispossessed envy-freeness: The rule ϕG is defined as ϕG(Vd, Vo) = (γ, Vg) for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vd < Vg. Then, ud(ϕGd (Vd, Vo)) = Vd < Vg = ud(ϕGo (Vd, Vo)). Hence,
ϕG does not satisfy dispossessed envy-freeness.
Since the allocation is independent of the reported valuations of the agents, ϕG is strategy-proof and
weakly pair strategy-proof. Since ϕG is constant, it is continuous and object continuous. Since the owner always
receives Vg, ϕ
G satisfies government budget constraint and owner welfare lower bound. Since the dispossessed
agent always gets the object, ϕG satisfies dispossessed welfare lower bound.
2. Strategy-proofness: The rule ϕmin,Vg is defined as
ϕmin,Vg (Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ,min{Vo, Vg}) if Vd ≥ Vg;
(Vg, γ) if Vd < Vg,
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for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vo < Vg ≤ Vd. Then, ϕmin,Vg (Vd, Vo) = (γ, Vo). Let V ′o be such that
Vg > V
′
o > Vo. Then, ϕ
min,Vg (Vd, V
′
o) = (γ, V
′
o). Hence, uo(ϕ
min,Vg
o (Vd, V
′
o)) = V
′
o > Vo = uo(ϕ
min,Vg
o (Vd, Vo)).
Then, V ′o is a profitable manipulation for the owner at (Vd, Vo). Hence, ϕmin,Vg is not strategy-proof.
It is to easy to see that ϕmin,Vg is dispossessed envy-free. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, if Vd ≥ Vg, the
dispossessed agent gets the object and the owner receives min{Vo, Vg} ≤ Vd. If Vd < Vg, the owner gets
the object and the dispossessed agent receives Vg > Vd. It is easy but cumbersome to show that ϕ
min,Vg is
continuous and object continuous.
Since the rule always assigns a compensation less than Vg, ϕ
min,Vg satisfies government budget constraint.
For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, if ϕmin,Vgo (Vd, Vo) 6= γ, then uo(ϕmin,Vgo (Vd, Vo)) = min{Vo, Vg}. Hence, ϕmin,Vg
satisfies owner welfare lower bound. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, if ϕmin,Vgd (Vd, Vo) 6= γ, then ud(ϕ
min,Vg
d (Vd, Vo)) =
Vg and Vg > Vd. Hence, ϕ
min,Vg satisfies dispossessed welfare lower bound. Finally, ϕmin,Vg is weakly pair
strategy-proof. The proof is very similar to the one of Proposition 2.
3. Continuity: The rule ϕ◦ is defined as
ϕ◦(Vd, Vo) =

(γ, Vg) if Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd ≥ Vg;
(γ,
Vg
2 ) if Vd ≥ τ(Vo) and Vd < Vg;
(Vg, γ) if Vd < τ(Vo) and Vo >
Vg
2 ;
(
Vg
2 , γ) if Vd < τ(Vo) and Vo ≤
Vg
2 ,
where τ(Vo) =
{
Vg
2 if Vo ≤
Vg
2 ;
Vg if Vo >
Vg
2 ,
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vo = Vg2 < Vd < Vg. Let {V no }∞n=1 be such that V no >
Vg
2 and
V no
n→∞−−−−→ Vg2 . Then, for each n = 1, 2, ..., ud(ϕ◦d(Vd, V no )) = Vg but ud(ϕ◦d(Vd, Vo)) = Vd < Vg. Hence, ϕ◦ is
not continuous.
It is easy but cumbersome to show (case by case) that ϕ◦ is dispossessed envy-free, strategy-proof, and
object continuous. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and i ∈ {d, o}, if ϕ◦i (Vd, Vo) 6= γ, then ϕ◦i (Vd, Vo) ≤ Vg. Hence, ϕ◦
satisfies government budget constraint. Since for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, uo(ϕ◦o(Vd, Vo)) ≥ min{Vo, Vg}, ϕ◦ satisfies
owner welfare lower bound. Since the dispossessed agent gets the object or receives a compensation greater
than his valuation, ϕ◦ satisfies dispossessed welfare lower bound. Finally, ϕ◦ is weakly pair strategy-proof. The
proof is very similar to the one of Proposition 2.
4. Object continuity: Let τ ∈ T and m ∈M(τ). The rule ϕ> is defined as
ϕ>(Vd, Vo) =
{
(γ,m(Vd)) if Vd > τ(Vo);
(τ(Vo), γ) if Vd ≤ τ(Vo),
for each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ be such that Vd = τ(Vo). Let {V nd }∞n=1 such that V nd ≡ τ(Vo)+ 1n . Then, V nd
n→∞−−−−→
τ(Vo) and for each n = 1, 2, ..., ϕ
>
d (V
n
d , Vo) = γ, but ϕ
>
d (Vd, Vo) 6= γ. Hence, ϕ> is not object continuous.
ϕ> satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, government budget constraint, owner
welfare lower bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness. The proofs are very similar to the ones of Theorems 1,
2, and 3, and Proposition 2. Since the dispossessed agent gets the object or receives a compensation greater
than his valuation, ϕ> satisfies dispossessed welfare lower bound.
5. Government budget constraint: The rule ϕk>Vg where k > Vg is defined as ϕ
k>Vg = ϕτ,m such that for
each Vo ∈ R+, τ(Vo) = k and for each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) = Vd.
Proof. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+ and Vd < k. Then, ϕk>Vgd (Vd, Vo) 6= γ. Then, ϕ
k>Vg
d (Vd, Vo) = k > Vg. Hence, ϕ
k>Vg
does not satisfy government budget constraint.
Since ϕk>Vg is a member of the τ -m family, by Theorem 1, Proposition 2, and Remark 3, ϕk>Vg satisfies
dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, dispossessed welfare lower bound and
weak pair strategy-proofness. For each (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+, if ϕk>Vgo (Vd, Vo) 6= γ, then Vd ≥ k and since k > Vg,
uo(ϕ
k>Vg
o (Vd, Vo)) = Vd ≥ min{Vo, Vg}. Hence, ϕk>Vg satisfies owner welfare lower bound.
6. Owner welfare lower bound: The rule ϕτ=m=0 is defined as ϕτ=m=0 = ϕτ,m where for each Vo ∈ R+,
τ(Vo) = 0 and each Vd ∈ Vd(τ), m(Vd) = 0.
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Proof. Let Vd ≥ 0 and Vo > 0. Then, ϕτ=m=0(Vd, Vo) = (γ, 0) and uo(ϕτ=m=0o (Vd, Vo)) = 0 < min{Vo, Vg} in
violation of owner welfare lower bound.
Since ϕτ=m=0 is a member of the τ -m family, by Theorem 1, Proposition 2, and Remark 3, ϕτ=m=0
satisfies dispossessed envy-freeness, strategy-proofness, continuity, object continuity, dispossessed welfare lower
bound, and weak pair strategy-proofness. Let (Vd, Vo) ∈ R2+. Then, for i ∈ {d, o} with ϕτ=m=0i (Vd, Vo) 6= γ,
ϕτ=m=0i (Vd, Vo) = 0 ≤ Vg. Hence, ϕτ=m=0 satisfies government budget constraint.
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